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Job Recruitment Networks and Migration to Cities in India 
Vegard Iversen∗, Kunal Sen∗, Arjan Verschoor+, and Amaresh Dubey#£  
 
Abstract 
Economists have focused on job search and supply-side explanations for network 
effects in labour transactions. This paper develops and tests an alternative explanation 
for the high prevalence of network-based labour market entry in developing countries. 
In our theoretical framework, employers use employee networks as screening and 
incentive mechanisms to improve the quality of recruitment. Our framework suggests 
a negative relationship between network use and the skill intensity of jobs, a positive 
association between economic activity and network use and a negative relationship 
between network use and pro-labour legislation. Furthermore, social identity effects 
are expected to intensify when compared to information-sharing and other network 
mechanisms. Using data from an all-India Employment Survey we implement a novel 
empirical strategy to test these relationships and find support for our demand-side 
explanation.   
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1. Introduction 
An extensive literature has addressed the impacts of social interactions and networks 
on labour market outcomes (McEntarfer 2003; Ionnides and Loury 2004; Wahba and 
Zenou 2005). One strand of this literature has focused on how networks and peer 
emulation may affect migration within or across countries (Stark 1991; Hatton and 
Williamson 1998; Munshi 2003). Empirical research has, however, found it hard to 
distinguish between network effects, which are transmitted to a migrant by virtue of 
the social connections he has access to, and peer emulation effects which are 
transmitted through the local neighbourhood he belongs to, whether at origin or 
destination. Crucially, the empirical literature has failed to distinguish the case where 
employers recruit through employee networks from that where networks simply 
transmit information about vacancies during job search. The tendency, therefore, has 
been to conflate demand-side and supply-side explanations for network effects 
treating them as one and the same thing.   
            To see why these effects are fundamentally different, consider a male Anand, 
residing in village-India, and contemplating whether to migrate to Mumbai. Social 
interaction and network effects may influence his migration decision as follows:  
Firstly, Anand may migrate to emulate village friends already settled in Mumbai. 
Secondly, Anand may migrate because his Mumbai-based co-villager Vijay has learnt 
about and informs Anand (and possibly others) about a vacancy. Thirdly, Anand may 
ask his relatives, Vijay and other Mumbai-based village friends to find him a job.1 
Finally, Vijay’s employer may ask Vijay to find a suitable person to fill a vacancy, 
and Vijay asks Anand to fill this vacancy in Vijay’s workplace. The first mechanism, 
the peer emulation effect, has received empirical support (e.g. Marmaros and 
Sacerdote 2002). The second and third mechanisms capture the information-
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 3 
dispersing role of networks, where networks are non-market institutions that may 
repair market failures. The fourth mechanism involves the strategic use of networks in 
recruitment. Acting as someone’s workplace guarantor involves considerable 
reputational hazards and is expected to make an employee middleman cautious and 
selective. This is likely to narrow the pool of potential recruits and strengthen the 
importance of social identity compared to information sharing and other network 
mechanisms.       
 Whether labour market failures should be a cause for concern depends on 
network outreach and on the services networks provide. If networks mimic local 
public goods by dispersing information about job vacancies or are widely accessible 
to job seekers, any concern would quickly dissolve.2 Furthermore, the role of policy 
would be straightforward; to improve the dissemination of labour market information.  
Policy conclusions are less cut and labour market failures potentially more 
severe if networks are screening and incentive mechanisms employers invoke to 
improve the quality of recruitment. If employer benefits from employee-referral are 
greater for low skill jobs, doubts about migration as an equitable route for escaping 
poverty would emerge.  
So far, the literature has favoured supply-side explanations for the high 
prevalence of network-based labour market entry among poor workers in developing 
countries (e.g. Wahba and Zenou 2005). The scale and adverse impacts of failures in 
lower end labour markets may therefore to a large extent have been overlooked.   
After sketching a theory of recruitment, we present the first attempt to filter 
out peer emulation effects and disentangle demand-side from supply-side explanations 
for how social networks affect migration behaviour. Our theoretical framework 
suggests more powerful network effects for less educated workers, more network-
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based recruitment during economic booms and less when legislation is worker-
friendly. Finally, social identities gain in importance when employers recruit through 
employee networks. 
In a path-breaking study of Mexican migrants to the US, Munshi (2003) is 
able to identify network effects. Using variation within each origin-community’s 
network over time, he controls for selectivity in the migration decision and for 
network endogeneity. However, Munshi is unable to distinguish the information 
dispersion from the strategic recruitment explanation for network use. His empirical 
analysis also does not distinguish workplace clustering caused by source community 
cohesion (peer emulation effects) from clustering reflecting employer preferences.  
Wahba and Zenou (2005) test for social network effects in job search. Their 
supply-side theory predicts a higher prevalence of network-based search among 
illiterate and semi-literate workers who are unable to read job-ads and vacancy posters 
and therefore have stronger incentives to search through friends and contacts. With 
vacancy information spreading through networks of weak ties, Wahba and Zenou in 
effect test a version of the information dispersion hypothesis of network effects. They 
argue that Egyptian labour market data support their main hypothesis but their 
empirical specification is too coarse to persuasively support this conclusion.3   
After filtering out peer emulation effects, we adopt the following strategy to 
identify referral based network effects. We use dyads4 or pairs of migrants as unit of 
analysis. Our binary dependent variable takes the value 1 when a pair of migrants 
working in a particular industry and in a particular city is from the same source area. 
In a perfect data set, we would be able to replace industry with firm, but industry at 
the high level of disaggregation we are able to offer is an attractive proxy. Informed 
by our theoretical sketch, we test whether the likelihood that a migrant pair working 
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in industry i and city j is from the same source area is higher for less educated 
migrants. Next and facilitating distinction between information dispersion and referral 
network effects, we test the impacts of pro-worker legislation and economic activity 
on our dependent variable. We then proceed to test for social identity effects. If 
networks are information-dispersing local public goods (e.g. Winters et al 2001) or if 
information spreads through weak ties (Wahba and Zenou 2005), an aggregate 
migrant stock (e.g. Carrington et al 1996) should suffice and make disaggregation by 
social identity unnecessary. We perform additional robustness tests to distinguish 
referral based network effects from rival accounts.  
The paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 sketches the theory of recruitment 
and section 3 outlines our empirical strategy for identifying our recruitment 
explanation for network use. Section 4 describes the data and provides descriptive 
statistics. Section 5 presents the empirical results, while Section 6 concludes. 
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2.  Networks as screening and incentive mechanisms  
Using data from a survey of 4,900 households in Mumbai, Munshi and Rosenzweig 
(2006) report that around 70 % of unskilled and blue collar workers found their first 
job through a referral. Among white-collar workers the corresponding figure was 
about 44%. Like us, Munshi and Rosenzweig attribute the high prevalence of referrals 
in low and unskilled occupations to the more acute information and enforcement 
problems in such jobs. These problems are likely to intensify in connection with 
migration. A newly arrived migrant asking for a job confronts a prospective employer 
with the challenge of ascertaining both the candidate’s ability and his trustworthiness. 
The candidate’s papers, if they exist, may not be reliable and his history may be costly 
to trace. Referral based recruitment may remedy the employer’s problem by screening 
and reducing uncertainty about the candidate’s labour productivity (Marsden and 
Gorman 2001) and by incentivising loyalty to the workplace (Fernandez and Castilla 
2001).5 The latter resonates with Holmstrom’s (1984; 219) anthropological accounts 
of motivations for referral-based recruitment among Mumbai employers; Above all he 
[a factory owner] wants a stable work force, people he has trained himself and who 
will resist the “temptation” to leave. Moreover, networks of existing employees are 
described as “useful as sources of unskilled labour, or people with enough basic 
education to learn semi-skilled tasks fast, but not for trained skilled workers (ibid.).” 
Turnover rates in India, especially among low and unskilled workers, are high 
(Mazumdar 1973; Newman 1979). While absenteeism shows little inter-industry 
variation and fluctuates around 10%, the average turnover in private sector industries 
is 18.7 % (Annual Survey of Industries 2002-03). There are stark inter-state contrasts, 
with West-Bengal reporting the lowest (5.2%) and Punjab (49.5%) the highest 
turnover rates.   
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2.1 Recruitment – a theoretical sketch  
Consider a small urban employer already employing a migrant worker and about to 
expand. Let θ  denote a high productivity and θ  a low productivity worker in a binary 
distribution of worker types. The employer must decide whether to recruit through the 
local labour market or use the employee’s village network. The first option offers the 
prospect: 
(1 ) ,p pθ θ+ −         (1) 
where (1) is the expected value added in output from a new recruit, and p is the 
probability that the recruit is highly productive. Following Marsden and Gorman 
(2001), the employee has an informational advantage if recruiting through his village 
network provides:   
(1 ) , .q q q pθ θ+ − >       (2) 
To start with, let the distribution of labour or task productivities in the urban 
labour market and the worker’s village network be identical.6 The informational gain 
from network-based recruitment is proportional to the heterogeneity in task 
productivity V θ θ= − , since the gain equals ( )q p V− . Consider, next, loyalty, where 
better discipline and lower turnovers are prospective employer gains from referral-
based recruitment as elaborated below:7  
Let    
( , , , )t t s SD G L=        (3) 
be the voluntary quit rate. Attrition depends on the human capital or skill-intensity of 
jobs, s, while SD is a measure of the social distance between the employee middleman 
and a new recruit. G is an indicator of the state of the economy and labour market 
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tightness (see Salop 1979), while L measures the degree of pro-labour legislation (see 
Besley and Burgess 2004). 
The employer’s workforce stability gain from referral-based recruitment, S, 
may now be written:  
[ ( , , , ) ( , , , )] ( ),m nS t s SD G L t s SD G L C s= −     (4) 
where tm and tn are attrition rates when recruiting through the market and through 
employee networks, respectively. C is the unit cost of replacing a worker. 
Replacement costs are likely to increase with skill-intensity, so that dC/ds > 0. 
Consistent with evidence cited above, we assume that m nt t−  attains its maximum for 
un- and low-skilled jobs.  
 The impact on S of an increase in skill-intensity becomes:  
( ) .m n m n
t tS CC t t
s s s s
∂ ∂∂ ∂ 
= − + − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
     (5) 
With the gap between attrition rates being higher in un- and low-skilled jobs, we 
have:   
,
n mt t
s s
∂ ∂
<
∂ ∂
        (6) 
so that the first term in (5) is negative, while the second is positive. For increasing 
skill-intensity of jobs, whether referral-based recruitment becomes more attractive 
depends, in part, on the relative strength of these two effects.8  
Consider, next, how social distance affects S. Compared to sharing 
information about a vacancy, bringing someone to the workplace exposes an 
employee middleman to considerable reputational risks and is likely to make him 
cautious and selective. This narrows the pool of potential recruits. SD measures the 
social proximity between the employee middleman and the new recruit and therefore 
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the intensity of the sanctions that may be imposed on a recruit reneging on this 
implicit contract. Hence:   
0,m nt tS C
SD SD SD
∂ ∂∂  
= − < ∂ ∂ ∂ 
      (7) 
where 0, 0.m nt t
SD SD
∂ ∂
≅ >
∂ ∂
 
Consider, next, the impact on S from a surge in economic activity:    
0.m nt tS C
G G G
∂ ∂∂  
= − > ∂ ∂ ∂ 
      (8) 
For a given skill-level, workers recruited through employee referral are expected to be 
more loyal and less responsive to a heating up of the economy.9 Hence, tm is more 
sensitive to a change in G than tn. In a tighter labour market, therefore, referral-based 
recruitment becomes more attractive for employers.  
Labour protective legislation may achieve much the same as network-based 
recruitment in cementing employer-employee relationships. Hence, 
0,m nt tS C
L L L
∂ ∂∂  
= − < ∂ ∂ ∂ 
      (9) 
where 0, 0m nt t
L L
∂ ∂
< <
∂ ∂
and .n mt t
L L
∂ ∂
<
∂ ∂
 
As for an economic contraction, the gains from referral-based recruitment are 
expected to decline since better working conditions make workers more keen to hold 
on to their jobs. Hence, risks from recruiting through the market decline, lowering 
employer gains from referral-based recruitment.  
Before elaborating on when employee referral will be attractive, we briefly 
describe the two labour pools.  
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2.2 Urban labour markets versus village networks 
 
Consider an industry where unskilled (u-s) jobs dominate. Let the binary 
distribution of individual productivities for such jobs in the village network be RusX . 
The village network will contain many individuals capable of doing such jobs well. 
The urban employer’s alternative is to recruit through the local labour market. Given 
the nature of u-s jobs, let UusRus XX = . This does not rule out systematic differences in 
the attributes of workers in the two pools. For instance, since village communities 
rarely are repositories of human capital, the average urban candidate is likely to be 
more educated. Yet, the simple nature of u-s jobs minimises labour productivity 
differences, driving productivity returns to education or skills in such jobs towards 
zero. In contrast and as table 1 suggests, for more human capital-intensive, semi-
skilled (s-s) jobs, education is likely to improve labour productivity:  
  
 [Insert table 1 about here]  
 
Column (a) covers unskilled (u-s) jobs with zero productivity returns to education. 
Column (b) summarises the productivity for each worker category in more human 
capital intensive (s-s) jobs, expressing the productivity of workers (with education 
level e1) in the urban pool as functions of the productivity of rural, unskilled workers 
in s-s jobs. With zero labour productivity returns to education in s-s jobs, 1m n= = . 
With positive returns, 1 1( ), ( ) 1m e n e > . Let m=n. In choosing between referral- or 
market-based recruitment, an employer will balance the employee’s informational 
advantage and the workforce stability gains S against the potential labour productivity 
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gains from hiring the more educated workers in the urban pool. Hence, the employer 
will rank the employee’s village network over market-based recruitment whenever:   
( )( ) ( 1) .q np S nβ β β− − + > −       (10) 
The right hand side measures the net productivity returns to e1 for low 
productivity workers and is positive when 1n > . To simplify, we normalise using 
1β =  as “numeraire”. Moreover, let a aβ β= =  where 1a >  measures worker 
heterogeneity. The employer will recruit through the urban labour market whenever:     
( )( 1) (1 ).np q a S n− − − > −       (11) 
Reorganising and for given exogenous values of q, p, a and S, a switch point is 
defined by: 
*
1
( 1) 1( ) .( 1) 1
q a S
n e
p a
− + +
=
− +
      (12) 
Consider the employee informational advantage and labour productivity returns to 
education, leaving S aside. 10 Figure 1 now displays a locus of switch points along 
which an employer is indifferent between the two recruitment strategies.  
 [Figure 1 about here] 
If other screening mechanisms are weak and the employee’s informational advantage 
distinct, positive productivity returns to the human capital of urban workers are 
necessary to induce a switch from network to market-based recruitment. Southeast of 
point A, it is better to recruit through the urban labour market since the labour 
productivity of urban workers outweighs employee informational advantages. In 
region C, labour productivity returns are insufficient to compensate for employee 
informational advantages making recruitment through the employee’s village network 
optimal. In D, recruitment through the urban labour market is again preferred. In 
summary, the theoretical sketch captures information asymmetries about worker 
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types, where loyalty and turnovers are endogenous and respond (i) to the social 
distance between employee middleman and the recruit, (ii) the state of the economy 
and (iii) pro-labour legislation. Furthermore, the relationship between skill-intensity 
and incentives for recruiting through employee village networks depends on S, but 
also crucially on the disparity between the labour productivity of urban and rural 
recruits as determined by the labour productivity returns to education in different 
occupations and jobs.          
 
3. Empirical strategy 
Our main hypothesis is that referral-based recruitment makes network effects stronger 
for low- and unskilled jobs. Furthermore, network effects intensify during economic 
booms and weaken when legislation is pro-labour. In addition, social identity effects 
are expected to be stronger, since employee referral narrows the recruitment pool. 
This section outlines how we identify network effects (by filtering out peer emulation 
effects) and our strategy for distinguishing referral-based from information dispersion 
network effects.  
To identify referral-based network effects we study the probability that a pair 
of randomly selected migrants who work in the same city and industry, with industry 
defined as narrowly as the data permits, are from the same source area. This 
benchmark empirical specification is given by:  
                        ijjiijijijij SFXD εδγααα +++++= 321 (13) 
where D is a dummy variable that takes the value one if a pair of migrants working in 
the same city and industry are from the same source area and zero otherwise; i and j 
denote industry and city respectively, X is a vector of control variables and F a vector 
of relevant migrant pair attributes such as education and social identities; iγ  are 
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industry dummies, jδ  city dummies and S a vector of stock network variables. We 
include individuals who have migrated from the same source region in the past five 
years in the migrant pairs in the dependent variable.  
Our choice of dependent variable enables us to uniquely map the probability 
that a migrant pair who work in the same industry in the same city and are from the 
same source area to the shared social characteristics of the matched migrant pair and 
therefore to test whether network effects, as our theory suggests, are stronger when 
migrants share characteristics such as low or zero literacy and social identity. We add 
controls for sex, age and other attributes expected to affect labour market outcomes. A 
distinction is made between recent and past network effects; ‘stock’ effects are 
exhibited when the dependent variable responds to past migration. Specifically, the 
stock variable comprises the number of migrant pairs working in the same industry 
and city that are both from the same source area for t >5 years.11  
The identification of network effects requires the filtering out of peer 
emulation and so-called ‘correlated effects’ (Manski 2000). The latter refers to the 
concentration of worker characteristics in particular source areas that are relevant to 
employment in specific cities and/or industries which could make it harder to identify 
network effects. For instance, if skilled weavers are disproportionately demanded in 
Mumbai and supplied from a particular part of Gujarat, there is a risk of attributing 
the clustering of migrated skilled weavers in Mumbai to network effects when the real 
cause is a concentration of supplied and demanded worker characteristics at source 
and destination. This problem is not likely to be particularly severe here, since we are 
forced to work with rather broad definitions of ‘same source area’. We do, however, 
check this possibility by testing the robustness of our results to the introduction of 
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source area dummies which control for variation in such concentrations of worker 
characteristics across source areas. 
Peer emulation effects imply that new migrants emulate past migration 
strategies and may appear identical to network effects.12 Emulation could result in 
clustering of migrants from the same source area in the same city and, possibly, 
industry which may be wrongly attributed to network effects. We adopt the following 
strategy to filter out peer emulation effects and identify network effects. We first 
construct our dependent variable such that the more obvious peer emulation effects 
are not considered. By restricting the analysis to employed migrants, those who have 
not found work are left out. Peer emulation effects may feature in this group, but 
referral-based recruitment does clearly not. Furthermore, in constructing our 
dependent variable, we adopt a definition of ‘same industry’ that is as narrow as 
possible, thus utilising the highly refined disaggregation of industry that our data 
permits (see Section 4). The more narrow the definition of ‘same industry’ in which a 
migrant pair from the same source area work, the more likely it is that referral-based 
network effects as opposed to peer emulation effects operate. While both emulation 
and referrals may get migrants to the same city as their peers, the likelihood of ending 
up in the same (narrowly defined) industry is greater for referral-based recruitment. 
Hence, the more precisely we are able to define destination industry, the more 
successful the filtering out of peer emulation effects. Finally, we introduce industry 
and city dummies, denoted iγ  and jδ  respectively. The city effects control for the 
possibility that workplace clustering of migrants from a particular region reflects 
migrant preferences for being with friends and family in the same city. The industry 
effects net out peer emulation effects whereby migrants emulate past migrants by 
seeking employment in industries where these past migrants found jobs.  
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We next describe how we distinguish referral from information-dispersion 
network effects. In our theoretical sketch, referral based effects are more likely for 
individuals with no or low levels of education. We construct four variables capturing 
migrant pair attributes – ILLijF , 
LOWLIT
ijF , 
MEDLIT
ijF , and 
HIGHLIT
ijF  which are dummy 
variables that take the value one when both migrants in industry i and city j are 
educated to the same level and where superscripts ILL, LOWLIT, MEDLIT and 
HIGHLIT denote migrant pairs who are illiterate or educated to the primary, 
secondary or graduate level, respectively. The empirical specification becomes: 
1 2 3 4 5
6 .
ILL LOWLIT MEDLIT HIGHLIT
ij ij ij ij ij ij
ij i j ij
D X F F F F
S
α α α α α
α γ δ ε
= + + + +
+ + + +
  (14)  
Our theory suggests that 2α  and 3α  are positive and greater than 4α  and 5α .   
The next step is to disaggregate the stock network measure by the level of 
education of migrant pairs. Hence, we disaggregate Sij into ILLijS , 
LOWLIT
ijS , 
MEDLIT
ijS , 
and HIGHLITijS  which represent stocks of migrant pairs who migrated from the same 
source region for 5t >  years, and where superscripts have the same interpretations as 
before.   
 The empirical specification becomes:  
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
.
ILL LOWLIT MEDLIT HIGHLIT
ij ij ij ij ij ij
ILL LOWLIT MEDLIT HIGHLIT
ij ij ij ij
i j ij
D X F F F F
S S S S
α α α α α
α α α α
γ δ ε
= + + + +
+ + + +
+ + +
  (15)  
If networks were information dispersion mechanisms, the stock of past migrant pairs 
in a particular industry and city should positively affect the availability of information 
about job opportunities in this city and industry. Accordingly, the aggregate stock of 
past migrants in city i and industry j from a particular source area should affect recent 
migration from this area. If so, α6 in equation (14) would be positive and significant. 
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In contrast, with referral based recruitment, migrants in low skilled occupations use 
their networks to recruit new workers. Hence for our theory to represent the more 
plausible account, α6 and α7 in equation (15) should be positive and significant, and 
greater than α8 and α9.  
To further distinguish referral from supply side explanations, we test the 
effects of city-wide unemployment (as an inverse proxy for the level of economic 
activity) and pro-labour legislation on our dependent variable. We then explore 
whether belonging to the same social group is among the migrant attributes that more 
precisely identify network effects. Variation in network effects across social groups 
from the same source area render the information-dispersion hypothesis less plausible 
since weak ties are necessary and sufficient for vacancy information to reach would-
be workers. In Wahba and Zenou (2005), such information spreads through weak ties 
and social identities do not enter the frame. Our hypothesis of social identity effects 
intensifying under referral based recruitment is consistent with specific social groups 
obtaining strongholds and clustering in particular industries, restricting job access to 
group members (Holmstrom 1984; Chandavarkar 1994).13    
4.  Data and descriptive statistics 
4.1 Data 
We derive our dataset from a large nationally representative employment survey 
implemented by the Indian National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) in 1999-
2000: the 55th which at the time of writing was the most recent available “thick” (i.e. 
comprehensive) survey round. The survey contains detailed information on a range of 
demographic, socio-economic and employment characteristics of every individual 
household member, and basic information (such as location, size, caste/religion, 
income and assets) for households as a whole.14 
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 We limit the dataset to individual working migrants in the seven largest urban 
agglomerates (UAs): Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Calcutta, Chennai, Delhi, Hyderabad 
and Mumbai. We reconfigured the dataset according to the location codes that make 
up UAs rather than cities narrowly defined to ensure that individuals commuting from 
outside a city’s boundaries are covered. We only use the seven largest UAs so that 
identical industry dummies may be deployed for each; in smaller UAs some industries 
are absent.  
 The NSSO data provides seven possible locations of last usual residence: 
migrants may originate from the district in which they currently reside, either from a 
rural (1) or an urban (2) area; they may have come from the state in which they 
currently reside but from a different district, again either from a rural (3) or an urban 
(4) area; they may have come from a rural (5) or an urban (6) area from another state; 
or from another country (7). For inter-state migrants, the NSSO data provides 
information on the name of the state.  We decided to keep urban-urban migration 
despite that our theoretical sketch applies more naturally to rural-urban migration. 
Areas classified in the NSSO data set as ‘urban’ include small towns in predominantly 
rural areas, which should not be excluded. We drop the relatively small categories 
from abroad and from the same district (both rural and urban).15  
 We construct all possible pairs of individuals working in the same industry in 
the same UA (henceforth, we call UAs cities). However, we eliminate reflexive pairs 
– that is, for two individuals A and B in the same industry and the same city, we 
include pair AB but not pair BA. The industries that these individuals work in are at 
the ISIC five-digit level of aggregation, which is the highest level of disaggregation 
the data permits. 16  Because of this high level of disaggregation, not all industries 
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have more than one observation for each city; in total, we are able to construct 2737 
pairs. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 2 plots the distribution of migrant pairs across the seven cities in our sample.  
 [Figure 2 about here] 
The distribution of pairs is uneven across these cities, with Mumbai comprising over 
47 per cent of the total sample, and Delhi only about 1 per cent. The proportion of 
migrants from the same region ranges from 32 per cent in Bangalore to 80 per cent in 
Delhi. Figure 3 presents the distribution of pairs across the top 10 industries in our 
sample.  
 [Figure 3 about here] 
The total numbers of pairs in these 10 industries comprise 71 per cent of our sample. 
Construction of Residential Buildings comprise 21 per cent of the number of migrant 
pairs and 75 per cent of the migrant pairs in this industry originate from the same 
source region.  
Table 2 presents odds ratios of the likelihood of being from the same source 
region for different migrant pair attributes, including education, caste (Scheduled 
Caste-SC, Other Backward Classes – OBC, and Others), and religion.17  
[Table 2 about here] 
The odds ratios exceed unity when both migrants are illiterate or educated to 
primary level or to graduate level or when the individuals in the migrant pair are from 
backward castes (SC/OBC). The odds ratios also exceed unity when both migrants are 
from the same religion or from different religions, except when one migrant is a 
Hindu and the other a Muslim (for the three principal religious groups considered). 
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The odds ratios are very high (over 2.0) when both migrants are illiterate, when one is 
illiterate and the other educated to primary level, when both are SC, when both are 
OBC, when one is SC and the other is OBC, and when both are Muslim or Christian. 
The odds ratios, thus, suggest that migrants are more likely to come from the same 
source region if they are less educated, from backward castes, and when both belong 
to minority religions. We next examine whether these observations receive 
econometric support. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
   A possible econometric problem with the pair measure is that it may induce 
spatial correlation between observations involving the same individual, and 
consequently bias standard errors. Since we construct pairs at the industry-city level, 
the spatial correlation may be present between observations in the same industry-city 
cell, but not across industries in the same city, or across cities for the same industry. 
There is also a possibility of heteroskedasticity across industries and cities. Therefore, 
we estimate a cluster-correlated estimate of the variance-covariance matrix in all the 
probit models presented (Wooldridge 2002) where we allow for cluster correlations 
within an industry-city cell.  
  We estimate maximum likelihood probit models and first use the specification 
in equation (14) to identify the impacts of migrant pair attributes and the general stock 
variable on the dependent variable with results presented in Table 3.  
 [Table 3 about here] 
In Cols (1), (2) and (3), we report effects of migrant pair attributes without industry 
and city dummies, with city dummies only, and with both industry and city dummies. 
We introduce three demographic controls – the product of the age of the two migrants 
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in the pair, and its square, and a dummy variable valued one when both migrants are 
male (zero otherwise). The main variables of interest are the migrant pair attributes 
related to education. As argued in Section 2, if referral based networks are the 
mechanism by which migrants move to cities and jobs, having zero or little education 
should increase the probability that a migrant pair working in industry i and city j are 
from the same source area. We find support for this hypothesis. With industry and city 
dummies included, the probability that both migrants are from the same source area 
increases by 15% if both are illiterate. This variable remains strongly significant at the 
one per cent level when the city and industry dummies are omitted, with city dummies 
only, and with both city and industry dummies. When both are educated to the 
primary level, the probability that the migrant pair is from the same source region 
increases by a range of 8-10% across these three specifications; the coefficients are 
significant at the one per cent level.18 In contrast, when both migrants are educated to 
the secondary or the graduate level, coefficients are not statistically significant in any 
of these equations. This supports the idea that chain migration is primarily a low 
education phenomenon (McEntarfer 2003).   
The aggregate stock network variable is also not significant in any of these 
three specifications. As argued in Section 3, if the information dispersion hypothesis 
is correct, we would expect a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the 
aggregate stock. That it is not suggests that the process whereby migrants from the 
same source region end up in the same city and industry is not driven by the use of 
networks to access vacancy information. For the control variables, the product of age 
and its square is significant, and age has a non-linear effect on the dependent variable, 
first decreasing and then increasing. The coefficient on both migrants being male is 
insignificant in most specifications.  
Page 20 of 35
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fjds
Journal of Development Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 21 
Our theory suggests that higher economic activity (and lower unemployment) 
at destination increases the likelihood of referral-based recruitment. We measure 
unemployment for the seven cities using the indicator of structural unemployment 
(defined as being unemployed throughout the year) from the NSSO employment 
survey and include this unemployment rate in Col. (4) of Table 3.19 We find that a 10 
% rise in unemployment leads to a 3.0% decrease in the likelihood of both migrants 
being from the same source region, with the coefficient on the unemployment rate 
significant at the one per cent level.  
Our theoretical sketch also suggests that more pro-labour legislation will 
reduce the loyalty gains from referral-based recruitment. We capture the degree of 
pro-labour legislation using the Besley-Burgess (2004) measure of labour regulations, 
which is available for India’s major states.20 We use this measure for the states in 
which Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad, Kolkata and Mumbai are 
located, and for Delhi, we use the value for the adjoining state of Haryana.21 A higher 
value implies that labour legislation is more pro-labour. The Besley-Burgess measure 
is included in Col. (5) of Table 3. We find that a 10% increase in the pro-labour 
legislation measure reduces the likelihood that both migrants are from the same 
source region by 0.30%, and that the labour legislation coefficient is significant at the 
five per cent level. These results further support our theoretical approach.  
Table 4 presents two robustness tests of the basic results.  
[Table 4 about here] 
Firstly, in Col (1) we introduce separate dummies for the twenty four states 
from which migrants in our sample originate. 22  This is to control for source region 
clustering of worker characteristics, as explained in Section 3. In Col (2), we only 
include individuals who have migrated from a different state than where they are 
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currently employed. This is to address the possibility that the positive relationship 
between the migrant pair originating from the same source region and both migrants 
being uneducated may be caused by an omitted variable – the distance from the 
source region to the destination industry/city. If uneducated migrants are more likely 
to travel to nearby cities and certain industries, less skill-intensive industries will have 
more migrants from the same (nearby) source area, especially if the source area has a 
concentration f less-educated individuals. By confining our sample to inter-state 
migrants (and keeping in mind that most Indian states are large geographical areas), 
we control for the effect of distance to travel on the clustering of migrants from the 
same source region.23       
 When we include source region dummies, the effects of the two variables of 
interest – both migrants are illiterates and both migrants are educated to primary level 
– are positive and significant at the one per cent level.  Thus, the effect of a positive 
relationship between lower skill intensity of networks and a higher likelihood that the 
migrant pair is from the same source region cannot be attributed to the possible 
concentration of illiterate and semi-literate migrants in a few source regions. When 
confining the sample to inter-state migrants, both migrants being semi-literate 
increases the likelihood that both migrants are from the same source region compared 
to the baseline specification in Table 3 (Col (3)). However, the coefficient on the 
migrant pair being both illiterate is not statistically significant.  
           Following equation (15), we next replace the aggregate stock variable with 
three disaggregated stock variables  - stocks of illiterate workers (stock_illiterate), 
stocks of workers educated to the primary level (stock_low literacy), and stocks of 
workers educated to the secondary level and beyond (stock – medium and high 
literacy). The results are presented in Table 5, Col. (1). As our theory suggests, the 
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coefficient on stock-illiterate is positive and significant at the one per cent level, while 
the coefficients on stock-low literacy and stock-medium and high literacy are 
insignificant. The attribute variables for both migrants being illiterate and being 
educated to primary level remain statistically significant. That the coefficient on the 
aggregate stock variable is insignificant along with the finding that among the 
disaggegated stock variables only stock-illiteracy is significant further supports our 
referral hypothesis.  
Finally, we study social identity effects and examine in particular the influence 
of caste and religion and estimate the impacts on the dependent variable by 
introducing the caste or religious background of migrant pairs in Cols. (2) and (3) of 
Table 5. In Col. (2), we include three dummy variables for the three main caste 
backgrounds on which we have information and in Col (3), three dummy variables 
capturing the three main religions in India. To illustrate, consider the first dummy 
variable Both SC which takes the value one if the migrant pair are both SC and zero 
otherwise. Similar dummy variables are constructed for Both OBC, Both Others as 
well as for Both Hindu, Both Muslim and Both Christian. We also include source 
region dummies in the probit equations augmented with caste and religion variables to 
control for possible source area concentrations of individuals from the same caste or 
religious background.  
In Col. (2), all three dummy variables pertaining to the same caste are positive 
and statistically significant. Among these three ‘same caste’ dummy variables, the 
characteristic that both individuals are of SC background has the strongest effect on 
the probability of being from the same source region. For the ‘same religion’ 
dummies in Col (3), ‘Both Muslim’ and ‘Both Christian’ are positive and statistically 
significant, while the ‘Both Hindu’ dummy is insignificant.  
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These strong social identity effects are consistent with the idea that social 
groups regulate access to work, favouring others from the same caste or religious 
background. This does not prove but is strongly suggestive of referral based networks 
being the principal mechanism through which clusters of individuals from the same 
source region in the same city and industry form. 
 
6. Conclusion  
This paper contributes to the growing literature on how social networks affect 
migration and labour market outcomes but focuses on demand-side explanations for 
network-based labour market entry. We sketch a theory of recruitment where 
employers use employee networks as screening and incentive mechanisms when 
recruiting into low-skilled jobs. Our empirical strategy involved firstly the filtering 
out of peer emulation effects from network effects; this guards our results from 
criticisms suggesting that migrants cluster in particular industries because of 
preferences for working with others resembling themselves or because of source 
community cohesion. We tested and found support for our hypothesis of a negative 
relationship between network effects and the educational level of migrants. While this 
is also consistent with Wahba and Zenou’s (2005) prediction of a higher incidence of 
network based search among illiterate and semi-literate workers, the strong social 
identity effects that we observe are not. Furthermore, our theoretical perspective, in 
contrast to theirs, suggests that employers would be reluctant to advertise such jobs. 
This is because advertising and broad dispersion of information through networks fail 
to remedy the information and incentive problems confronting employers when 
asymmetric information is a prevalent feature of labour transactions which referral 
based recruitment help employers to overcome. Tests of the effects of pro-labour 
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legislation and economic activity and two other robustness tests provided further 
support for our demand-side account.   
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1
 Following Granovetter (1973), Dasgupta (2000;382) notes that “the reason weak ties are especially useful in job 
search is that they cover a greater range of links than strong ties do. Weak ties connect one to a wide variety of 
people and therefore a wider information base.” Whether strong or weak ties matter – in search or recruitment – is 
an empirical question. Banerjee’s (1983) data on migrants in Delhi show weak ties to be vital during search, while 
we hypothesise that employee referral narrows the recruitment pool. In principle, poor migrants may limit search 
to strong tie networks, but this requires the strong assumption that they can afford a strategy that is likely to 
generate fewer job opportunities.    
2
 Banerjee (1983) found network access to transcend caste-boundaries with family and village ties serving similar 
functions in aiding migrants, and networks resembling local public goods. On Mexican data, Winters et al. (2001) 
found family or strong ties to provide no advantages over weak community ties, suggesting cumulative public 
knowledge about migration to be open to all irrespective of social or economic backgrounds. Munshi (2003;551) 
notes that belonging to the same origin community (paisanaje) entitles Mexico-US migrants to network access.       
3
 Wahba and Zenou’s (2005) network variable – which is a proxy for the number of random contacts per unit of 
time – is the population density of a region. This is a highly imperfect proxy and our analysis involves far more 
refined variables for identifying network effects, specifically the presence of similar migrants from a particular 
source area in a precisely defined city and industry.   
4
 The dyadic approach has gained popularity in network analysis by combining attractive statistical properties with 
intuitive appeal (Wasserman and Faust 1995; de Weerdt 2004).   
5
 Montgomery (1991) assumes assortative matching in contacts prompting employers to recruit through their most 
talented employees.    
6
 This, as suggested below, is plausible for un- and low-skilled jobs.  
7
 Hence referral-based recruitment cements employer-employee relations, thereby tackling a particular form of 
moral hazard.   
8
 This refers to the workforce stability-gain from employee referral. Section 2.2 shows how incentives for 
recruiting through employee village networks are also affected by the typical human capital scarcity of village 
communities.  
9
 Using US-data, Faberman (2005) reports a negative correlation between voluntary quits and unemployment.   
10
 Including S is a straightforward matter.   
11
 We experimented with different values of t in the construction of the network and stock variables with no 
change in our results. 
12
 Thus exemplifying so-called ‘endogenous interactions’ (Manski 2000), whereby the propensity to behave in a 
certain way varies with the average behaviour of one’s social reference group. 
13
 Such clustering is also, in principle, consistent with information sharing networks where labour market 
information is restricted to specific groups. While this is a prevalent explanation in the literature, there are two 
objections. As Winters et al (2001) demonstrate on data from Mexico, keeping information about migration 
opportunities under wraps may be very difficult. Secondly, clustering is only plausible when consistent with 
employer interests. In contrast to referral-based recruitment, spreading vacancy information through networks does 
not resolve the screening and incentive problems confronting employers in contexts where asymmetric information 
is a prevalent feature of labour transactions.   
14
 The NSSO Employment Survey covers more than 120,000 households and more than 600,000 individuals, 
37,146 of whom are living in the seven largest urban agglomerates, 12,284 are in addition currently working,  
and 4,723 are in addition migrants. 
15
 The NSSO employment survey also asks about migration motives. We omit individuals who migrated to enrol in 
an educational institution or for marriage. In these cases, migration was clearly not linked to recruitment through 
referral.  
16
 There are 117 industries in our sample which also include the service sector. 
17
 Others comprise individuals who are neither SC, OBC nor Scheduled Tribe (ST).  
18
 These are marginal effects estimated from the probit models. 
19
 To avoid co-linearity, we omit city dummies in specifications that include the unemployment rate and labour 
legislation variables.  
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20
 The Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 sets out the conciliation, arbitration and adjudication procedures to be 
followed during industrial disputes. The Act has been amended by state governments post-independence. Besley 
and Burgess code state level amendments to the Act as being pro-worker, neutral or pro-employer. Each pro-
worker amendment is given the value 1, each neutral amendment the value 0, and each pro-employer amendment 
the value -1. These scores are cumulated over time and we use the cumulative scores in 1999, the year of the 
employment survey used in this paper.  
21
 Several manufacturing plants in the UA of Delhi are located around Gurgaon, an industrial region in the state of 
Haryana, and one can assume that the city of Delhi has similar labour laws as Haryana. 
22
 There are forty-six source region dummies in all – twenty-three each for the two individuals in the migrant pair 
(we drop one dummy in each case to avoid multicollinearity). The dummy for a particular state takes the value one 
when the migrant is from that state, zero other wise.   
23
 In constructing our dependent variable we exclude individuals who have migrated from the same district, thus 
reducing the possible role of distance to travel in explaining why migrant pairs in a particular city are from the 
same source region. Furthermore, the coarseness of the source area definition that we use works to our advantage 
as the more broadly defined the source area, the less likely that source areas will be markedly different in terms of 
concentration of worker characteristics. 
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Table 1: Worker types, labour pools and labour productivity returns to 
education  
 
(a) Industry with manual, u-s jobs (b) Industry with s-s jobs. 
 
Labour productivity in u-s jobs: zero labour 
productivity returns to education 
Labour productivity in s-s jobs: positive 
productivity returns to education 
Low productivity 
worker in village 
network with no or 
little education 
 
θ  
 
β   
High productivity 
worker in village 
network with no or 
little education 
 
 θ   
 
β  
Low productivity 
worker in urban pool 
with e1 education  
 
θ    
 
1( )m e β  
                   
High productivity 
worker in urban pool 
with  e1 education   
 
θ   
 
1( )n e β  
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Table 2. Odds ratios of the likelihood of being from the same source region  
Characteristics of migrant 
pair Odds ratio 
Per cent of total number of pairs  
Both illiterate 3.04   6.4 
Illiterate and educated to 
primary level 2.13 
14.0 
Illiterate and educated to 
secondary level 0.81 
  9.8 
Illiterate and educated to 
graduate level 0.32            
  0.5 
Both educated to primary 
level 1.45              
11.6 
Educated to primary level 
and educated to secondary 
level 0.71 
21.2 
Educated to primary level 
and educated to graduate 
level 0.37          
  1.0 
Both educated to secondary 
level 0.63 
23.9 
Educated to secondary level 
and educated to graduate 
level 0.87 
 
  7.0 
Both educated to graduate 
level 1.07 
  4.5 
SC-SC 2.50   2.4 
SC-OBC 2.29   8.3 
SC-Others 0.50   6.0 
OBC-OBC 2.56 17.0 
OBC-Others 0.49 18.7 
Others-Others 0.86 43.1 
Hindu-Hindu 1.27 76.0 
Hindu-Muslim 0.49 13.7 
Hindu-Christian 1.32   4.9 
Muslim-Muslim 3.58   4.6 
Muslim-Christian 1.41   0.4 
Christian-Christian 5.63   0.8 
Odds ratios are calculated as follows. First, for all migrant pairs from the same source region, the 
number of migrant pairs with a particular set of attributes is expressed as a ratio of the number of 
migrant pairs that do not have those attributes. Second, an analogous ratio is computed for all migrant 
pairs not from the same source region. The first ratio is then divided by the second ratio. Pairs are 
constructed of migrants that work in the same city and industry (see Section 4.1).  
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Table 3. The impacts of migrant pair attributes and migrant stock on dependent 
variable: benchmark and augmented specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Product of Ages 
of Migrant Pair  
-0.00024 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004 
(0.0005) 
-0.0011 
(0.0004)*** 
-0.0051 
(0.0001)*** 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
Square of 
Product of Ages 
of Migrant Pair 
0.00000002 
(0.00000082) 
0.0000001 
(0.0000001) 
0.0000003 
(0.0000001)*** 
0.0000001 
(0.00000008)*** 
0.00000007 
(0.000000001) 
Both male 0.09 
(0.10) 
0.11 
(0.12) 
0.18 
(0.11)* 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.17 
(0.12) 
Stock 0.0015 
(0.0014) 
0.0006 
(0.0008) 
0.0002 
(0.0008) 
0.0007 
(0.0003)* 
0.0019 
(0.0010)** 
Both illiterate 0.66 
(0.16)*** 
0.51 
(0.17)*** 
0.45 
(0.17)*** 
0.20 
(0.06)*** 
0.66 
(0.18)*** 
Both educated 
to primary level 
0.27 
(0.09)*** 
0.28 
(0.10)*** 
0.29 
(0.11)** 
0.09 
(0.05)* 
0.33 
(0.10)*** 
Both educated 
to secondary 
level 
-0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.04 
(0.10) 
-0.06 
(0.08) 
-0.07 
(0.04)* 
-0.14 
(0.09)* 
Both educated 
to graduate 
level 
0.30 
(0.24) 
0.005 
(0.29) 
0.31 
(0.27) 
0.15 
(0.08)* 
0.42 
(0.24)* 
Unemployment -- -- -- -0.04 
(0.01)*** 
-- 
Labour 
Regulation 
-- -- -- -- -0.08 
(0.04)** 
City dummies? No Yes Yes No No 
Industry 
dummies? 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Log Pseudo-
Likelihood 
-1821.5 -1771.3 -1703.0 -1742.9 -1760.9 
N  2737 2737 2737 2737 2737 
a) Equations are ML probits.  
b) *, ** and *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively;  
c)  Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within 
industry-city cells.  
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Table 4. Migrant pair attributes - tests of robustness  
 (1) (2) 
Product of Ages of Migrant 
Pair  
-0.0008 
(0.0003)*** 
-0.0008 
(0.0005) 
Square of Product of Ages 
of Migrant Pair 
0.0000002 
(0.0000001)** 
0.00000008 
(0.0000002) 
Both male 0.15 
(0.1) 
0.67 
(0.23)*** 
Stock 0.0004 
(0.001) 
-0.0009 
(0.002) 
Both illiterate 0.57 
(0.13)*** 
0.33 
(0.32) 
Both educated to primary 
level 
0.28 
(0.09)*** 
0.41 
(0.13)*** 
Both educated to secondary 
level 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.13 
(0.11) 
Both educated to graduate 
level 
0.35 
(0.29) 
0.25 
(0.44) 
City fixed effects? Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects? Yes Yes 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood  -1617.5 -794.5 
N  2727 1324 
a) Equations are ML probits.  
b) *, ** and *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively;  
c) Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within 
industry-city cells.  
d) Col (1): Dummies for source regions included– each region is assigned a value one if the migrant is 
from that region, zero otherwise – see Footnote 21 for more details on the construction of the dummies; 
Col (2): Restricted to inter-state migrants.    
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Table 5. Stock network and social identity effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Product of Ages of Migrant Pair  -0.0008 
(0.0003)*** 
-0.0011 
(0.0003)*** 
-0.0010 
(0.0004)*** 
Square of Product of Ages of Migrant Pair 0.0000002 
(0.00000001)** 
0.0000003 
(0.0000001)*** 
0.0000003 
(0.0000001)*** 
Both male 0.21 
(0.1152)* 
0.018 
(0.0009)  
-0.001 
(0.1112) 
Stock  0.0004 
(0.0008) 
0.0008 
(0.00008) 
Stock-illiterate 0.0054 
(0.0023)*** 
-- -- 
Stock-low literacy -0.0068 
(0.0071) 
-- -- 
Stock-medium and high literacy -0.0029 
(0.0032) 
-- -- 
Both illiterate 0.40 
(0.19)** 
0.56 
(0.14)*** 
0.53 
(0.13)*** 
Both educated to primary level 0.29 
(0.12)** 
0.18 
(0.09)** 
0.18 
(0.09)* 
Both educated to secondary level -0.06 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.10) 
Both educated to graduate level 0.35 
(0.27) 
0.38 
(0.31) 
0.39 
(0.30) 
Both SC -- 0.72 
(0.34)** 
-- 
Both OBC -- 0.46 
(0.12)*** 
-- 
Both Others -- 0.33 
(0.09)*** 
-- 
Both Hindu -- -- 0.20 
(0.15) 
Both Muslim -- -- 0.99 
(0.47)** 
Both Christian -- -- 1.39 
(0.66)** 
City dummies? Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies? Yes Yes Yes 
Source Area dummies? No Yes Yes 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood  -1689.4 -1585.8 -1585.1 
N  2737 2727 2727 
a) Equations are ML probits.  
b) *, ** and *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively;  
c) Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within 
industry-city cells.  
d) Col (1): Stock split into stocks of illiterate workers (stock-illiterate), stocks of workers educated to 
primary level (stock-low literacy), and stocks of workers educated to secondary level and beyond 
(stock-medium and high literacy). 
Col (2): Includes ‘same caste’ variables (see Section 5).  
Col (3): Includes ‘same religion’ variables (see Section 5).    
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Figure 1: Switch points for network versus market-based recruitment  
(p=0.5)   
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Figure 2. Distribution of migrant pairs by cities 
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Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of migrant pairs by industries 
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Source: authors’ calculations. 
Top Ten Industries in terms of numbers of pairs; Industries: 1 – Construction of Residential Buildings; 
2 – Textile and Clothing Accessories; 3- Employment of Domestic Help; 4 – Defence-related 
Activities; 5 – Retail Sale of Food Items; 6 –Restaurants without Bars; 7- Taxi Services; 8- 
Manufacture of Gold Jewellery; 9 – Software Publishing; 10- Painting and Decorating.  The total 
number of pairs in these ten industries comprises 71 per cent of total sample. 
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